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From the Bankruptcy Courts
Benjamin Weintraub* and Alan N. Resnick**

THE EARMARKING DEFENSE TO
PREFERENCE ACTIONS: THE
REQUIREMENTS OF THE BOHLEN
DECISION

A trustee in bankruptcy carries
out one of the primary principles
of the Bankruptcy Code-the equal
distribution of the debtor's property
among creditors-by recovering
voidable preferences under Section
547 of the Code. 1 Among other requirements, a payment i,s a voidable
preference only if it involves a transfer of the debtor's property. Occa-,
sionally, a trustee seeking to avoid
a preferential payment is met by the
evolving "earmarking" 2 defense;
that is, the funds used to pay the old
debt were recently advanced by a
new lender for the sole purpose of
* Special Counsel to the law firm of
Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler,
New York, N.Y. Member of the National
Bankruptcy Conference.
**Benjamin Weintraub Distinguished
Professor of Bankruptcy Law, Hofstra University School of Law, Hempstead, N.Y.;
Counsel to the law firm of Fried, Frank,
Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, New York,
N.Y. Member of the National Bankruptcy
Conference.
I ii U.S.C. § 547.
2
See Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed.
1979), which defines "ear-mark" as "a
mark put upon a thing to distinguish it from
another. . . . ProptlrlY is said to be earmarked when it can be identified or distinguished from other property of the same
n~ture."

paying the old debt and, therefore,
such funds never became the debtor's property. As the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had stated: "[I]f all_ that occurs in a
'transfer' is the substitution of one
creditor for another,· no preference
is created because the debtor haS-not
transferred property of his estate;
he still owes the same sum to a
creditor, only the identity of the
creditor has changed. " 3
Facts of the Case
In In re Bohlen Enterprises, Ltd. ,4
a case involving a bizarre set of
facts, the earmarking defense confronted the trustee. The debtor was
engaged in a retail office equipment
business and, in April 1986, owed
two separate obligations to the National Bank of Waterloo, both secured by a single security agreement. One obligation was a shortterm inventory loan of $189,000
dating from November 1985, and
the other was a- longstanding arrangement for an open line of credit
in the amount of $125,000.
InlateApril1986, the bank insisted that the overdue $189,000 obli3
Coral Petroleum, Inc. v. Banque Paribas-London, 797 F.2d 1351, 1356 (5th Cir-:1986).
4
859 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1988), rehearing denied (Feb. 17, 1989).
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gation be repaid by the end of the
month. In an effort to satisfy the
bank, the president ·of the debtor,
Bohlen, applied to John Deere Community Credit Union for a $200,000
loan. He disclosed to the credit
union the debtor's $125,000 obligation owed to the bank but failed to
disclose its $189,000 obligation. He
told the credit union that if it provided the $200,000 loan, $125,000 of
the proceeds would be used to ree_ay
the $125,000'0bligation to the bank,
and the rest would be used for miscellaneous purposes. The credit
union agreed to those arrangements.
The credit union's formal approval of the loan did not occur until
May 1, 1986, but the credit union
determined on April 30, 1986, that
the loan would be granted and
opened a "share draft account" 5
in the debtor's name. Bohlen was
given blank share drafts to use in
drawing on the share draft account.
The court oLappeals observed that
the opening of the share draft -account on April30, the day before the
approval and funding of the loan,
''was a critical fact in the rather
bizarre series of transactions which
followed.' ' 6 The transcript did not
disclose why the account was
opened prior to the approval and
funding of the loan or why the debt5
• 'The record does not disclose the exact
nature of a 'share draft account' or the exact
nature of a 'share draft. • So far as we can
determine they are indistinguishable from
tile usual bank checking account and the
usual form of checks used in connection with
such an account." Id. at,562 n.l.
6
Id. at562.
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or was given the blank share drafts
before there was any money in the
account.
On April30, 1986, Bohlen "purported to utilize and draw upon the
share draft account despite the fact
that on that date it had nothing in
it. " 7 On that day, he issued a share
draft on that account in the sum of
$192,000, payable to the bank, and
deposited it in the debtor's checking
account at the bank. Immediately
thereafter, Bohlen wrote and delivered three checks drawn on the debtor's checking account at the bank,
each payable to the bank, totaling
$191,777.21. One check was for
$189,000 to repay the principal of
the larger debt, one was for
$1,708.77 representing interest on
that loan, and the third was for
$1,068 . .50 to pay the interest on the
$125,000 obligation. The principal
of $125,000 remained unpaid. All
three checks collectively constituted
the transfer that was later alleged to
be a voidable preference.
The court of appeals stated that
''the conclusion is inescapable that
Mr. Bohlen on his own had decided
to pay off the. $189,000 obligation
to the bank, which he was being '
pressured to return at once, .and
to leave the $125,000 obligations
unpaid. . . . '' 8 Bohlen expected the
$191,777.21 share draft to be made
good by the credit union's depositing the entire $200,000 of loan
proceoos in the share draft account
so that he could draw freely on the
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account as he saw fit. The credit
union, however, apparently surprised Bohlen by depositing only
$74,931.50 of the loan proceeds in
the share draft account.
The remainder of the new loan
was funded on May 1 by the credit
union:s issuance of a check for
$125,068.50 jointly payable to the
debtor and the bank. The credit
union apparently intended the joint
payee check to be endorsed by the
debtor and delivered to the bank to
pay off the.$125,000 obligation as
Bohlen had promised. If the check
was indorsed and turned over to the
bank, the bank would clearly use it
as repayment of the $125,000 loan,
and this action would leave Bohlen
without funds to cover the outstanding check~used for the unauthorized
payment of the $189,000 obligation. "Mr. Bohlen was apparently
unable to resolve that dilemma and
the joint payee check was never
negotia~ed. '' 9

$74,931.50, would cover th'e share
draft. Thus, on May 2, 1986, at
8:05 A.M., utilizing a drivethrough window at the credit union,
Bohlen purported to deposit into the
debtor's share draft account at the
credit union a check for $125,000
that he wrote on the debtor's cheCking account at the bank, an account
with no funds in it. The court of
agpeals characterized this 'Scheme
as "a desperate check-kiting
scheme in which Mr. Bohlen was
playing for time" 10
Although the $125,000 check deposited in the share draft account
eventually was dishonored, the
$192,000 share draft deposited in
the checking account cleared the
credit union's normal electronic
process during the night on May 1
and was paid. The court summarized the state of affairs at that time:

Playing for Time

I

Without further action on his
part, Bohlen's plan to pay the
$189,000 obligation without disdosing that debt to the credit union
was doomed to failure; only
·$74,931.50 was available to cover
the $191 ,777.27 share draft that he
had written, and he could not use
the remaining $125,000 of new loan
proceeds because that was embodied. in the joint payee check. His
need was for another $125,000,
which, when added to the

As of Monday, May 5 then, the picture was as follows: The credit union
and the debtor had made a deal for a
new $200,000 loan to the debtor with
the credit union stipulating that
$125,000 oft:lle proceeds be used to
retire the debtor's $125,000 obligation to the bank, the only obligation
of the debtor to the bank .known to
the credit union. Through t!l.Y share
draft account, the credit union had
advanced $192,000. None of that
money had been used to, pay the
$125,000 obligation. Instead, the
bulk of the money was used to pay
the $189,000 obligation which was
still unknown to the credit union. 11
10

9

!d.

It
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Bank's Defense
On July 21, 1986, the debtor filed
a voluntary petition for relief under
the Bankruptcy Code, and thereafter the trustee instituted an adver-,
sary proceeding against the bank,
asserting that the three checks writ~ ten by Bohlen on April 30 totalling
$191,777.27 in favor of the bank
constituted voidable preferences
under Section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. 12 The bank's defense
was that the entire sum of
$191,777.27 was protected from
tredtznent as a voidable preference
A by lhe doctrine of "earmarking"
or, in the alternative, that, under
$ection 547(b)(5), it did not receive
a greater sum that it would have
received in a chapter 7 liquidation.
12
Section 547(b) provides:
(b) ~xcep~ as provided in subsection (c)
ofth1s sect1on, the trustee may avoid any
transfer of an interest of the debtor in
property(!) to or for the benefit of a creditor·
(2) for or on account of an anteced~nt
debt owed by the debtor before such
transfer was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made(A) on or within 90 days before the
date of the filing of the petition; or
(B) between 90 days and one year
before the date of the filing of the
petition, if such creditor at the time
of such transfer was an insider; and
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would
receive if.(A) the case were a case under Chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made;
and
(C) such creditor received payment
of such debt to the extent provided
by the provisions of this title.

[VOL. 23 : 307 1991]

The alternative defense W?S premised on an assumption that the bank
(1) was a secured creditor and Cl)
had a right of setoff under Section
553 of the Bankruptcy Code.
The court of appeals reviewed the
findings of the bankruptcy judge, 13
who had held that $125,068.50 of
the $191,777.27 was not a voidable
preference because of earmarking
and, rejecting all of the bank's other
defenses, held that the trustee was
entitled to recover $66,708.77 from
the bank as a preferen!ial transfer.
Both sides had appealed to the district court, which had affirmed the
'
bankruptcy court's decision. 14
Before the court of appeals, the
trustee again argued that the application of the earmarking doctrine to
any of the funds was an error of
law. The bank contended that the
doctrine should be extended to protect the entire $191,777.27 and
pressed its alternative defense that
it had a right to retain the entire ~urn
under Section 547(b)(5) because it
would have received at least an
equal sum in a chapter 7 distribution. As to the latter assertion, the
bank no longer pressed its claim as
a secured creditor. The assertion
was solely premised on the rjght of
setoff.
Court of Appeals' Decision
Addressing the merits of the case,
the court of appeals indicated that
13
See 78 Bankr. 556 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa
1987).
14
See 91 Bankr. 486 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa
1987).
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Section 547(b) began with a threshold requirement that a voidable
preference must involve a ''transfer
of an interest of the debtor in property," 15 and if such a transfer was
involved, the trustee had the right
to set it aside as a voidable. preference if it satisfied all the requirements set for in Sections 547(b)(l)547(b)(5). A dispute existed only
as to the requirement of Section
547(b)(5), but ~e court of appeals
held its decision as to that. requirement in abeyance until it had dealt
with. the major dispute. "[The]
threshold requirement [is] that the
transfer being attacked be a transfer
of an interest of the debtor in property ... 16

leavin,g the definition of the term
entirely to the courts. The court then
began to explain the earmarking
concept by listing the players involved:
In every earmarking situation there
are three necessary dramatis personae. They are the "old creditor",
(the pre-existing creditor who is paid
off within the 90-day period prior to
·bankruptcy), the "new creditor" or
"new lender" who supplies the funds
to pay off the old creditor, and the
debtor.
When new funds are provided by the
new creditor to or for the benefit of
the debtor for the purpose of paying
the obligation owed to the old creditor, the funds are said to be "earmarked'' and the payment is· held not
to be a voidable preference. 18

Application of Doctrine
The court of appeals, focusing on
the question of whether the earmarking doctrine was properly applied to any of the funds in the case,
first considered the origins and rationale of the doctrine and its various applications. "The earmarking
doctrine is entirely a court-made
interpretation of the statutory requirement that a voidable preference must involve a 'transfer of an
interest of the debtor in property'. " 17 Examining the history of
earmarking, the court found' that
neither the former Bankruptcy Act
nor the present Bankruptcy Code
defines ''property of the debtor,''
15

564.

"

Bohlen Enterprises, Ltd., 859 F.2d at

16Jd.
/d. at 565.

17

Application to Guarantors
The court of appeals noted that
the earliest enunciation of the earmarking doctrine occurred in cases
where the new creditor who provided the new funds to pay off the old
treditor was also obligated to pay
that prior debt. In essence, the new
creditor was a guarantor, such as a
surety, a subsequen_t indorser, or a
straight contractual guarantor.
In instances where the guarantor
paid the debtor'·s obligation directly
to the old creditor, courts did not
view such payment as a voidable
preference because the payment did
18
/d. Seeid. atn.Softhecourt'sopinion:
"In the beginning the term 'earmarking' was
not used. That nomenclature was apparently
used for the first time in this context in Smyth
v. Kaufman, 114 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1940)."
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not constitute a transfer of the debtor's property and there had been no
diminution of the debtor's estate.
"[T]he new funds and new debt
were equal to the preexisting debt
and the amount available for general
creditors thus remained the same
as it was before the payment was
made." 19 The court also noted a
possible additional rationale for the
development of the earmarking doc-.
trine in guarantor situations: the
avoidance of unfairness and inequity to the guarantor. "If his direct
payment to the old creditor was
voided, and the money was ordered
placed in the bankruptcy estate, the
new creditor, as guarantor, would
have to pay a second time.' ' 20
Where the guarantor· entrusted
the new funds to the debtor with
instructions to use them to pay the
debtor's obligation to the old creditor, the courts logically reached the
s~me result. Continuing its historical discussion, the court of appeals
observed:
In this later type of case [i.e., payment to the debtor with instructions
to pay the old creditor], the courts
have been willing to overlook the
fact that the method .chosen by the
guarantor to pay off the old creditor
was one in which the debtor was
given some control of the new
funds. . . . In some instances the
language used has been that the debtor was holding the new funds "in
trust" or in a "fiduciary capacity."
In other cases the courts have said
19

Bohlen Enterprises, Ltd., 859 F.2d at

565.
20

/d.
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they would not let form control over
substance. . . . Finally, as in the
direct payment situations, almost every opinion emphasizes that the result
involves "no diminution" in the
debtor's estate. 21

Extension of Doctrine
The court then observed, with
apparent disapproval, that the earmarking doctrine has been extended
to situations in which the new creditor was not a guarantor but merely
loaned funds to the debtor to enable
the debtor to pay an older creditor. 22
''The equities in favor of a griarantor or surety, the risk of his having
to pay twice if the first payment is
held to be a voidable preference,
are not present where the new lender
is not a guarantor himself. Yet the
courts, without much detailed analysis of the differences, have routinely made) the extension to nonguarantors.' ' 23
The court further observed that
where there was no guarantor the
eaonarking doctrine helped neither
the debtor nor the new lender. The
new creditor is actually harmep by
the earmarking doctrine because, as
a general creditor, recovery must
21
/d. at 565-566. The court noted that
the term "earmarking" was "probably dev~sed as a synonym for these terms." /d. at
565 n.9.
22
"As a matter of first impression, it
would seem that the doctrine should not have
been so extended." /d. at 566.
23
Id. But see In re International Club
Enterprises, Inc. 109 Bankr. 562 (Bankr.
D.R.I. 1990) (limits earmarking doctrine to
situations in which the funds transferred
were based on a guarantee or similar obligation).

312

FROM THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS

come from the debtor's estate,
which had been diminished to the
extent that the payment made to the
old creditor could not be recovered
as a preference. Observing that the
only person to benefit from the doctrine is the old creditor who had
nothing to do. with earmarking the
funds and who, in equity, deserves
no such benefit, the court could see
no basis for preferring the old creditor to another who was paid with
nonearmarked funds.

Application of Doctrine
Despite the court's uneasiness
with the development of the earmarking doctrine, it found that it
was not necessary in this case to
decide whether use of the doctrine
in nonguarantor situations ''should
not be preserved, limited, or even
rejected entirely. ' ' 24 The court observed that, regardless of whether a
nonguarantor advanced the funds,
the instant case involved an improper extension of the earmarking doctrine beyond situations in which it
had previously been employed. The
court of appeals enunciated three
requirements that have to be met
before a transaction will qualify for
the earmarking doctrine:
1. The existence of an agreement
between the new lender and
the debtor that the new funds
will be used to pay a specified
antecedent debt;
2. Performance of that agree24

566.

Bohlen Enterprises, Ltd., 859 F.2d at

ment according to its terms;
and
3. The transaction viewed as a
whole (including the transfer
in of the new funds and the
transfer out to the old creditor)
does not result in -any diminution of the estate.-25
In the instant case, the court found
that the second requirement had not
been met since the proceeds of the
credit union's new loan was not
used to pay the $125,000 obligation.
Although there were two debts to
be paid, payment of the larger debt
was not within the agreement of the
parties. The court then went beyond
its own requirements and stated:
"Even if we apply. the frequently
invoked test of whether the debtor
had 'control' over the funds provided by the new lender, the instant
facts nevertheless require a holding
that a voidable preference has occurred. One cannot conceive of
greater or more telling 'control' of
the new funds by the debtor than to
have the debtor use theriJ for its
own purposes and in violat~on of its
agreement with th~ new lender.' ' 26
The bankrupcty court apparently
recognized that its decision involved a new extension of the earmarking doctrine based on general
equitable principles. The bankruptzs Id. "Where a guarantor pays the old
creditor directly, the requirement of an
agreement between the new lender-guarantor and the debtor is inapplicable. For the
reasons discussed supra, no voidable preference can exist even in the absence of a
specific agreement.'' /d. at 566 n.ll.
26
/d. at 567.
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cy judge noted that a court of equity
should "look through form to substance" and should·"act to achieve
the intended result [of the parties]. " 27 The bankruptcy judge commented that failure to follow these
equitable principles in extending the
earmarking doctrine in this case
would ''result in unjust enrichment
to the estate and the general creditors. " 28
The court of appeals did not agree
that extending the earmarking doctrine to these facts was required by
equitable principles. The recovery
of any preference adds to the funds
of the estate and to the general creditors' dividends, but this activiry has
never been viewed as "unjust enrichment" of anyor{e. Additio.nally,
application of the earmarking doctrine would not achieve the parties'
''intended result'' where none of the
parties contemplated the debtor's
bankruptcy, the unwinding of transactions, and the division of the estate. "Moreover, the bank's only
intention was that its $189,000 loan
would somehow be repaid, regardless of the source of the funds. " 29
Finally, the new pay off of the
$189,000 debt and not the $125,000
obligation was not the result intended by the new lender. ''Equity does
not require a court to construct a
hypothetical transaction which did .
not occur in order to allow what is
really a preference to remain in the
old creditor's hands. ' ' 30
27

/d.

28

/d.

29

/d.

30

/d.
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Bank's Alternative Argument
The bank's alternative argument
was that, even if the. earmarking
doctrine did not apply, the entire
sum of$191,777.27 was nota voidable preference because, under Section 547(b)(5), the bank did notreceive more than it would have
obtained in a chapter 7 liquidation:
This contention was based on an
alleged right of the bank to set off
the entire payment against the debtor's total debt to the bank. The court
below had rejected this defense on
three separate grounds, but the court
of appeals found it necessary to tum
only to Section 553(a)(3), which
allows a setoff' 'except to the extent
that . . . (3) the debt owed to the
debtor by such creditor was incurred by such creditor . . . . (c) for
the purpose of obtaining a right of
setoff against the debtor. '' The
court held that the right of setoff was
inapplicable and that, therefore, the
payment to the bank was a voidable
preference. The court of appeals
reversed the judgment below and
remanded it for further proceedings
in conformity with its opinion (i.e.,
the complete turnover of the total
~mount of$191,777 .27).
Dissenting Opinion
In dissenting, Circuit Judge Thendore McMillian commented that
the transfer had no effect on the
assets to be distributed to the creditors because the credit union's
check of $125,068.50. was written
for the purpose of paying off the
debtor's debt to the bank. The fact

314

FROM THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS

that this specific check was not used
to pay the deptor's obligation to the
bank did not alter the fact that at least
$125,068.50 of the credit unions'
funds that were int~nded to be used
to pay the debtor's debt to the bank
were, in reality, used for that purpose.
The dissent apparently placed no
weight on the facts that there were
two debts owed to the bank, that the
new funds advanced were earmarked for the payment of the
smaller debt, but that the funds were
used in fact to pay the larger debt.
The dissent relied on the earmarking
standards enunciated in the treatise,
Collier on Bankruptcy, which apparently does not expressly require
strict performance of the precise
terms of the new lender's agreement:
The [earmarked funds] rule is the
same regardless of whether the proceeds of the loan are transferred directly by the [new creditor] to the
[old] creditor, or are paid to the debtor with the understantling that they
will be paid to the [old] creditor in
satisfaction of his claim, so long as
such proceeds are clearly "earmarked. " 31

Interpretation of Majority Opinion
Comparing the majority's threeprong requirements for application
of the earmarking doctrine and the
standards set forth in Collier on
Bankruptcy, it appears that the court
of appeals was going beyond the

current state of ~e law in restricting
earmarking to those situations involving strict compliance with the
new lender's agreement. Underothe
Collier on Bankrupte.y testi it appears to be sufficient that the earmarked funds eventually are transferred to the old creditor, whether or
not they are used to pay the specific
debt contemplated by the new lender
or are used in accordance with the
terms of the agreement.
As is often the case, the court of
appeal's decision has raised as many
questions as it has answered by requiring performance of the new
lender's agreement according to its
terms in order to apply the earmarking doctrine. It is difficult to
foresee that the Bohlen Enterprises,
Ltd. requirements will be met unless
one of the concepts of "control,"
"in trust," or ina "fiduciary capacity" is present. Conceivably, these
concepts could be employed in determining whether there is a diminution of the estate. These concepts,
however, may have been eroded as
evidenced by the recent case of In
re Oliver's Stores, Inc. 32
Erosion of Concepts
In Oliver's Stores, Inc., the debtor needed a new financing bank and
arranged to substitute the old with
the new upon the new bank's lending Oliver's Stores $3 million to pay
the old. It was the "express
understanding between the parties
that the [new] loan proceeds would
be used to repay the [old loan]" 33

31
/d. at 569 (quoting 4 Collier on Bankruptcy , 547.03 at 547-525 (15th ed.
1987)).
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112Bankr. 671 (Bankr. D.N.J.'1989).

33

/d. at 678.
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although the new lender "did not court finds that the January 5, 1987
take any action to restrict Oliver's payment to [the old lender] by Oliuse of the proceeds of the [new ver's did not diminish or deplete the
lender's] loan. " 34
estate because the [new lende~] loan
On December 29, 1986, Oliver's funds were directly 'earmarked' for
Stores issued a check in the amount payment to [the older lender]. " 35
of$2,949,000 from its checking acConclusion
count at the new bank payable to
The
Bohlen
Enterprises, Ltd., deOliver's Stores and deposited the
cision
may
be
used
by courts to both
proceeds of that check into Oliver's
broaden
and
narrow
the application
investor savings account also mainof
the
earmarking
doctrine.
As evitained at the new bank. On January
tlie
decision
in
Oliver's
denced
by
5, 1987, the new lender wired
$3,000,010 from Oliver's investor Stores, Inc. , which used the Bohlen
account to ·Oliver's checking ac- Enterprise_s, Ltd. , test to arrive at
count with the old lender which then the wrong conclusion, so long as the
charged Oliver's account in full re- new lender and the debtor agree that
the funds will be used to pay the old
payment of its loan.
debt
and the funds are then used for
Notwithstanding that no agree·that
purpose,
courts may hold that
ment was reached among the parties
earmarking
is
available as a preferas to a direct payment to be made
ence
defense
despite
the fact that the
from the new lender to the old lenddebtor
has
control
of
the funds, does
er' that there were no restrictions
not
hold
the
funds
"in
trust" and is
on the use of the monies by the
36
not
in
a
fiduciary
role.
On the other
debtor, and that there was a transfer
of
terms
of the
hand,
performance
of the monies from a checking acagreement
between
the
new
lender
count to the debtor's interest bearing savings account, the court held and the debtor is required. If the
that the funds had been earmarked "earmarked" funds are used to pay
because of the parties' understand- the old lender, but with regard to. a
ing that the funds would be used to debt not contemplated by the new
lender, then earmarking is unavailpay the old debt.
able.
It is interesting to note that, in
support of the holding that there was
3
' /d. at 677.
36
proper earmarking, the court cited
But see In re Sierra Steel, Inc., 96
the Collier on Bankruptcy as well as Bankr. 271 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1989) (earmarking doctrine did not .apply where earthe Bohlen Enterprises, Ltd. re- marked
funds were deposited in debtor's
quirements. "[T]he court fmds, general ac~unt and preferred creditor failed
through the stipulation of facts, that to trace the" funds); New York City Shoes,
v. Best Shoe Corp., 106 Bankr. 58, 61
[the old lender] satisfied all tiers Inc.
(Bankr. B.D. Pa. 1989) ("for funds to be
of the [Bohlen] test. Therefore, the 'earmarked' the third party lender must exer34

/d. at 675.

cise strict control over the distribution of the
funds which it advances to the debtor").
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